Every Maritime Statute of Limitations in One Place

Every maritime deadline at a glance

Maritime law does not give injured people one deadline to remember. It gives them a patchwork, and the right maritime statute of limitations depends entirely on the kind of claim and the law that governs it. The table below puts the major periods in one place. Use it as a map, then read the sections that follow for the detail that decides close calls. When a date is anywhere near, confirm it with a maritime attorney rather than relying on a chart, because the wrong assumption here is the kind of mistake that cannot be undone.

Geography matters too. On the Outer Continental Shelf, the offshore platforms off Louisiana and Texas in the Gulf of Mexico borrow the adjacent state's deadline under the Outer Continental Shelf Lands Act, and that period can run shorter than the federal three years. One other pattern is worth noticing before the detail: the shortest windows belong to the claims people are least likely to know about, the Longshore notice period and the cruise ticket clock. For a deeper look at how these dates interact across a single accident, see our companion guide on maritime claim timelines and deadlines.

The general ruleThe three-year clock

The three-year clock: Jones Act and general maritime claims

The maritime statute of limitations most injured workers meet first is the three-year rule. Congress wrote it into federal law at 46 U.S.C. § 30106, which says a civil action for personal injury or death arising out of a maritime tort must be brought within three years after the cause of action arose. That single sentence covers a lot of ground. It governs a Jones Act seaman's negligence claim against an employer, a seaman's claim that a vessel was unseaworthy, and wrongful-death claims under the Death on the High Seas Act. It is, in effect, the default deadline for maritime injury and death.

This three-year period is sometimes called the Uniform Statute, because Congress meant it to bring order to what had been a confusing mix of borrowed state deadlines. The Supreme Court reinforced that goal in McAllister v. Magnolia Petroleum Co., 357 U.S. 221 (1958), holding that a seaman's Jones Act and unseaworthiness claims should be measured by the same limitation period rather than split apart. The practical takeaway is steady: if you are a seaman hurt on navigable waters, plan around three years and do not let a defendant carve your claim into pieces with different clocks.

Maintenance and cure, the no-fault support a seaman is owed during recovery, is the one piece that does not fit neatly. It arises under general maritime law and is technically governed by laches, an equitable doctrine that asks whether a delay was unreasonable and unfair to the other side. Courts that apply laches still look to the three-year rule as the measuring stick, so the safe assumption is the same three years, with the burden falling on a worker who waits longer to explain the delay.

AccrualWhen the clock starts

When the clock starts: the discovery rule

Knowing you have three years is only half the question. The other half is knowing when the three years begin. For most accidents the answer is simple: the clock starts on the day you are hurt. But maritime work produces injuries that do not announce themselves at once, from hearing loss to chemical exposure to repetitive strain, and for those the law uses the discovery rule.

The Supreme Court set the foundation in Urie v. Thompson, 337 U.S. 163 (1949), a case under the Federal Employers Liability Act whose accrual rules the Jones Act borrows. The Court held that a worker is not charged with the running of the clock until the injury manifests itself, so a latent condition does not quietly expire before the worker even knows it exists. Later maritime decisions, including Norfolk Shipbuilding and Drydock Corp. v. Garris, applied the same idea: the period begins when a person knows, or with reasonable diligence should know, both the injury and its likely cause.

That sounds forgiving, and in the right case it is, but it is also a trap for the overconfident. Defendants argue hard that a worker should have connected the dots earlier, which would start the clock sooner and run it out. Because the discovery rule turns on what you knew and when, the date your claim accrued can itself become a fight. If your injury surfaced long after the incident, that is a reason to talk to a lawyer sooner, not later, so the timeline is documented while the facts are fresh.

Longshore Act30-day notice

Longshore deadlines: 30-day notice and the one-year claim

Dock workers, harbor construction crews, ship repairers, and many others are covered not by the Jones Act but by the Longshore and Harbor Workers' Compensation Act. The Longshore system has its own clocks, and they are shorter and stricter than the three-year rule, which is exactly why they catch people off guard.

Two deadlines matter. First, under 33 U.S.C. § 912, you must give your employer written notice of the injury within 30 days. Thirty days is not much time when you are hurt and focused on treatment, and a late or missing notice gives the employer a ready argument to contest the claim. Second, under 33 U.S.C. § 913, you must file your formal claim for compensation within one year of the injury, or within one year of the last voluntary payment if the employer paid benefits without an award. For occupational diseases that do not immediately disable a worker, the claim window stretches to two years, again measured from when the worker knew or should have known the disease was work related.

The pattern is familiar by now: the notice window is short, the claim window is firm, and the discovery principle still does the work of deciding when a hidden condition's clock began. If your work touches the waterfront rather than the open sea, do not assume you have years. Pin down which deadline applies as early as you can, and if you are weighing the route entirely, our guide on what to do after a maritime injury walks through the first moves that protect a claim.

Wrongful deathDeath on the high seas

Death at sea: DOHSA and wrongful-death deadlines

When a maritime worker dies, the family's right to bring a claim runs on a clock of its own, though in most cases it is the same three-year clock. The Death on the High Seas Act governs deaths that occur beyond three nautical miles from shore, and the limitation period that applies to it is the uniform three years found in 46 U.S.C. § 30106, measured from the date of death rather than the date of the underlying injury.

Wrongful-death claims closer to shore can be more complicated, because more than one body of law may apply and the available remedies differ depending on the worker's status and where the death occurred. A seaman's death may bring Jones Act and general maritime wrongful-death claims; a passenger's death at sea may be governed by DOHSA; a death in state waters can pull in state wrongful-death law alongside the federal rules. Those overlaps change what survivors can recover, but the timing question usually returns to the same three-year period.

The reason families need to act early is not only the deadline. Evidence in a fatal maritime case, including vessel logs, maintenance records, and the recollections of a crew that soon scatters, fades quickly. Preserving it is part of protecting the claim, and that work has to begin long before the three years are up.

PassengersThe one-year trap

Cruise and passenger claims: the one-year contractual trap

Passengers assume they have the same three years everyone talks about. They usually do not, and the reason is printed in the ticket. Federal law at 46 U.S.C. § 30508 lets a passenger carrier shorten the time to sue, and cruise lines take full advantage. The statute sets floors a carrier cannot go below, a notice period no shorter than six months and a suit period no shorter than one year, and the major cruise lines write their contracts right at those floors.

The result is the harshest maritime statute of limitations a hurt traveler is likely to face. In practice, a cruise passenger often has just one year from the date of injury to file a lawsuit, and as little as six months to give formal written notice of the claim. Courts enforce these provisions when they are reasonably communicated to the passenger, even when the passenger never read the fine print, a rule the Supreme Court endorsed in the line of cases on cruise ticket terms. Missing the date because it was buried on page nine of a ticket is, unfortunately, still missing the date.

If your injury happened aboard a cruise or other passenger vessel, treat the ticket as the controlling document and read its limitation clause immediately. Do not measure from the three-year rule, and do not wait. The single most common way a strong passenger case is lost is a calendar, not a courtroom.

The United StatesThe two-year rule

Claims against the U.S. government: the two-year rule

Some maritime injuries happen aboard government vessels, on federal projects, or in accidents involving the United States as an owner or operator. Those claims do not follow the three-year rule. They are governed by the Suits in Admiralty Act and the Public Vessels Act, and both impose a two-year statute of limitations under 46 U.S.C. § 30905. Sovereign immunity makes these deadlines especially unforgiving, because the government has consented to be sued only on its own terms, and courts apply those terms strictly.

There is also a procedural step that can quietly eat the two years. Before suing, a claimant generally must present the claim in writing to the federal agency that owns or operates the vessel, and a waiting period can follow before suit may be filed. That means a worker cannot simply file on the last day; the notice and waiting steps have to be sequenced so the lawsuit still lands inside the two-year window. Mistakenly filing under the wrong statute, such as the general Federal Tort Claims Act, does not stop the maritime clock from running.

If the United States is anywhere in your accident, whether the vessel, the dock, or the project, assume the two-year rule and the extra notice steps apply, and get advice early enough to complete them in order.

ExceptionsWhen the clock bends

How deadlines shift: tolling, minors, and the owner's clock

Deadlines feel absolute, and mostly they are, but a few doctrines can move them. Tolling is the legal term for pausing a clock that has started. Equitable tolling can apply when a defendant's own conduct, such as concealment or active misleading, prevented a worker from filing in time, a principle maritime courts have recognized in cases involving latent harm. The discovery rule from Urie, discussed above, is the most common softener, because it controls when the clock starts in the first place.

One assumption worth correcting: many people expect that being a minor automatically pauses a maritime deadline the way it can in some state-court cases. For the uniform three-year maritime statute, courts have generally held the opposite, treating the period as substantive and largely unaffected by a plaintiff's age or similar conditions. That makes prompt action even more important in cases involving young or incapacitated claimants, because the protective tolling people expect may not be there.

There is also a clock that runs against the vessel owner, not the worker. Under the Limitation of Liability Act, an owner who receives written notice of a claim has six months to file a petition to limit liability, a deadline now found at 46 U.S.C. § 30529. It rarely changes a worker's filing date, but it shapes how a case unfolds and where it is heard. The throughline across all of this is simple: exceptions exist, they are narrow, and none of them is a reason to wait. The reliable protection is to identify your deadline and act well ahead of it, ideally with a maritime lawyer who can confirm which clock controls. For a step-by-step look at the moves that protect a claim from day one, see our guide on the steps to take after a maritime injury, and our companion reference on maritime claim timelines and deadlines lays the dates out side by side.